New Method for Quantifying Commitment in Games
Prof. Weber’s latest research paper on “Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria,” forthcoming in the International Game Theory Review, proposes a player-specific measure of commitment, on a scale of 0 to 1, for any Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game. The findings, first presented at the 2017 Conference on Game Theory and Management (GTM) in St. Petersburg, Russia, and the 2017 European Meeting on Game Theory (SING13) at the Université Paris-Dauphine in France, relate to Prof. Weber’s earlier work on optimal commitment (Weber 2014). The proposed measure of commitment is the first of its kind for generic games.
To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average over all adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.
Weber, T.A. (2019) “Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria,” International Game Theory Review, forthcoming. [Download]
Weber, T.A. (2014) “A Continuum of Commitment,” Economics Letters, Vol. 124, No. 1, pp. 67—73. [Download]